CLPEX Chat Board

I was going to sit this one out...

Pat W wrote:

As Lisa Steele has pointed out, she is not worried about the easy prints, she is worried about the borderline prints.

My concerns are based on Dr. Dror's work on confirmation bias. He writes that bias is unlikely to affect clear data, but it becomes an increasing problem as the data becomes more ambiguous. So on that none, I like Pat W's proposal for increased scrutiny of more difficult prints. I'd likely add in to factors that might trigger a higher level of review -- high profile cases (including potential death penalty cases where applicable) and cases where the examiner has been exposed to significant potentially baising information about the case (detective told him/her about a confession, eyewitness, DNA results, etc.). Those seem to be places worth a second check.

I think Pat W raises an interesting issue about dillution of responsibility. Tho on the other hand, it seems harsh for someone's career to ride on not making a mistake -- that would seem to create perverse incentives to cover-up a mistake if it is discovered later. Part of my job is to look over trial counsel's shoulder for serious errors he/she might have missed. Habeas counsel looks over my shoulder (and trial counsel's shoulder) for ineffective assistance of counsel issues. Last year I testified in habeas that I made a particular judgment call about an issue as appellate counsel, but it could have gone another way, and looking at the case many year later, I know think I should have done the other thing. I made the decision then for reasons that seemed good at the time, but I'm ok if the habeas court concludes that i was wrong and reversed the conviction. It's embarassing, but not a career-ender (so long as it happens rarely). (So far, the habeas court has not found those sorts of decisions unreasonable.) I'm working on an issue now, that, in light of research articles that were not available in 1998, I see an issue that I didn't recognize then. I expect I'll write to the client to say "here's this newly discovered material, take this to a habeas attorney" and we'll see what happens.

Hi Pat and Les
I have to agree with Pat on this one. As 90% or so of identification work is in the 12 plus points group so why not.

We seem to be making life so difficult for ourselves just to be sounding more scientific. If the push is for statistic based idents then why not simplify things and say were there is over 12 clear points this is the case blar blar blar (in excess of 12 million million to one) but were there is less than 12 CLEAR points there is a different course of action.

I think Arie has a very good point.

For the record in Auckland there are two verifiers though else where in the country I am not so sure, any Comment JohnT?

Since I've been asked to comment...

For about 10 years now we have adopted a national policy of having 2 verifications after the inital identification is made. For various reasons this was adopted from the previous policy of 1 verification after we started the process of formally discontinuing the 12 point rule. Just as a reminder - the '12 point rule' was very much a post filter on identifications made in NZ to determine suitability for giving evidence in court.

My opinion re verification is summed up reasonably well in the quote below from Alan McRoberts who I believe was quoting David Ashbaugh;

It should be distinguished that “the verification is not part of the identification process. It is a very important part of the scientific process.” (FPs - What They Can and Cannot Do)

Unless the verifiers are suitably experienced, identification errors will still be a potential issue. If anything, I am even more cautious/attentive as the final (2nd) verifier than as teh initial identifier or 1st verifier. I know in practice I attempt to give every print the same scrutiny but with verification my mind set is to prove the identifier wrong and it is a pleasant result to see he/she actually got it right (in my opinion/experience)

Now back to work...

Hi John, Les, Neville, others...

I have followed this thread with curiosity. Is the primary view here: 1) that a second verifier will catch errors? or 2) that each identification is of a level of sufficiency that satisfied at least 3 experts?

To be clear, it seems that the chance of an erroneous id, especially given the enormous training requirments and skill of experts in the national training programmes in Australia, NZ, the UK, etc. would be relatively low to begin with...I can't fathom that a second verifier would be needed.... How many errors does the first checker find? (if close to nil, why a second one?)....

OR

You can say that each id has been scrutinized by two additional individuals. In this way, the reproducibility of the decision is being demonstrated. By extension, it would have increased value if 10 experts agreed, 100 experts, 500 and so on... Three is a nice manageable number.

Or am I totally off track here....

Thanks for your time.

(Additionally, when did you guys install a double verification scheme and why? Was there any single event that prompted it?)

g.

Hello Glenn,

The Australian identification standard came into effect in 2000 as a national standard. Prior to that several Police organisations were practising no set number with verification (following 1975 lead). The current standard has it written that a second expert must agree with the identification. While I was not part of the process of drawing up the standard it appears that ACEV (& Neurum)would have been incorporated in the considerations. To date , that I am aware, we have no incidents of error as in false positives from court testimony. That does not discount that errors of all types may occur but have been removed due to the checking process. I know one state that will have four checks of the identification if the result is to be issued as a court report. This level of scrutiny is an insurance to the public that we are preserving the standard. I would not think the current Advisory group are contemplating removing or reducing the verification component because of the zero error position we enjoy. I do think that as a professional group we are serious about the public trust in our authority as experts. Experts here are qualified in Tenprint, Crime Scenes, Laboratory techniques, Latent identifications and Court Testimony.

Just to add to the other thread from Pat and Neville, the fact of doing a technical function can be incorporated within the scientific umbrella. Our science comprises valid principles relating to a specialised skin tissue, it has a standard which is contemporary according to groups such as SWGFAST, there is a method ACEV that is valid for comparative analysis, within that method is a technique (similar + spatial + sequential = sufficient) leading to conclusions that are reportable and again validated by our collective knowledge and experience. The science has a body of knowledge ranging from Biology to Chemistry, Physics and Mathematics. Fingerprinting as a means of personal identification is significant not only in law enforcement but in many areas of our lives. Cheers

Good point g

Thnx John

In 1980 I started in Auckland I still had 18months of training to go to qualify so my work was checked by one expert. As I remember it, the experts only had their idents checked if they were not 100% happy. In fact Ident memos were sent out to the CIB directly from the expert making the ident. About 1983ish after a couple of typos it was decided it would be prudent to have the ident memos checked for typos. Soon after there was an influx of newbees into the office from HQ, all fully trained, but where checking was normal practice it was decided with much relief that all idents would be checked by the supervisor. After that we had a delegation from NZ who went to Israel (two inspectors) who came back declaring the 12 point rule was out the door. Then in the late 1990's we had an influx of staff from England who were amazed that we did not have double verification. So guess what!

Having been a second and final checker I have never found a wrong identification as such, but I have found on about 5or6 occasions cases were I have not been happy to sign them as I have felt that there was not sufficient detail, in fact I have probable thought it to be bias getting in the way.

I believe each identification should stand on its own merit.

I think it is a good practice, though this would prove very difficult in a small office. I have no idea how some small offices in the USA can operate, though they do, as they do in places like Fiji. I guess it really becomes an issue only if it goes to court, I remember in Auckland that was when you had your chart checked!!!

In response to the comments from G - "Is the primary view here: 1) that a second verifier will catch errors? or 2) that each identification is of a level of sufficiency that satisfied at least 3 experts?"

My answer is Yes to both.

But to now try and clarify a bit (maybe without much success), I would change the order of 1 & 2. My reasons are raised in the next paragraph from G.
"it seems that the chance of an erroneous id, especially given the enormous training requirments and skill of experts in the national training programmes in Australia, NZ, the UK, etc. would be relatively low to begin with...I can't fathom that a second verifier would be needed.... How many errors does the first checker find? (if close to nil, why a second one?)...."

The chances of an outright error are extremely low. (Without knowing the ground truth I maintain it is zero) The 2nd Verifier has not needed to 'catch' an error that I'm aware of. Therefore I do understand 'not fathoming that a second verifier would be needed'. The 2nd verifier is the manager or acting manager (fingerprint expert) of the latent print section and in addition to the verification of each identification made on a file they are also responsible to ensure there are no clerical errors. But the main purpose in my opinion is to ensure that the 'gray' area of suitable/unsuitable is not crossed. They are the gate keeper to ensure the identifications are 'safe'. As you have suggested in point number 2. How that is objectively carried out comes back to the debate on how confident we are with any fingerprint identification. Of course they should also catch errors - in practice there just aren't any to catch.

So why a 2nd verifier? Yes, you could say that the reproducibility of the decision has been demonstrated - but not in court evidence - unless asked specifically by defence. We certainly can't lead that evidence. I have been asked by defence to name the 2 verifiers while giving evidence. Not sure his purpose and it certainly did no favours to the accused, but not a usual practice.

And finally - the only event that initiated the move to 2 verifiers was when we stopped the 12 point rule as mentioned earlier.

Hope that helps.

JT

PS A final note re point 2 from g - "a level of sufficency that would satisfy 3 experts". Often the initial identification will be made by a fingerprint trainee rather than by a qualified fingerprint expert. This is potentailly an additional reason to have 2 'experts' conduct verification.

RM -

Just to add data to your survey, I work at a lab in California, and all of our identifications have to be verified by one other qualified examiner. "Qualified examiner" requires that the person has passed our training program for latent print comparison, but does not require that he/she be certified by any outside body such as the IAI. Our in house training program consists of: learning the history of fingerprints and their use for identification (including the memorization of about 100 different important people and dates), learning the biology of friction ridge skin and how the ridges are formed, learning some basic chemistry regarding the composition of the moisture secreted from the pores on friction ridge skin, comparison exercises, AFIS training, training on how to decipher movement/smudging in the clarity of print, and a few other exercises and tests. Once training is over, the examiner must pass a competency test. Then he/she must complete 50 supervised cases without any errors (errors being missed identifications or incorrect identifications). Upon completetion of the 50 supervised cases, the examiner is considered qualified.

And that is all before the crime scene training or the chemical processing of evidence training, ha.

I know that our supervisor tries to follow guidelines set out by organizations such as SWGFAST. I also know that our lab, so therefore also our training program, is ISO certified by ASCLD.

Hope that helps,

B

Qualified for us means completing 5 years as a fingerprint trainee covering theory and practical work in all aspects of fingerprint work; identifcation, history, biology, classification, crime scene, exhibit treatment (chemical), fingerprint photography, ALS, deceased persons, DVI, law & expert evidence in court,
while also doing supervised case work and periodic examination over that period. This concludes with a final examination that includes latent identifications, theory exams and oral (court) examination. At that point as a rough estimate the trainee would have completed at least 2500 cases and probably identified over a 1000 persons (never mind the individual identifications on each case with multiple prints and the prints eliminated as the complainants).

A qualified fingerprint examiner acts as mentor and our National Fingerprint Training Officer provides specific moduler training at each step and conducts the examinations assisted by senior staff.

Once qualified they are able to be the 1st verifier (and give expert testimony). Generally the 2nd verifier with be a Senior Fingerprint Officer (Latent Print Examiner) with few years more experience.

In earlier postings on this topic Pat Wertheim was providing information about the system in the Netherlands. This has motivated me to respond in order to paint the process and in particular the new situation we have created since November 2009 (of which Pat was unaware.) First I would like to say that I agree with Pat that there is risk that more verifiers may induce an attitude to avoid responsibility and rely upon others.

In our new AFIS (MorphoTrack) the workflow is changed and has become as follows:
All marks are entered a first time without manual encoding and if no match follows the better part of the mark will be lassoed and manually encoded.
Candidate lists are forwarded to a pool and can be picked up by the same expert or randomly picked up by, or assigned to, another practitioner. If this practitioner finds a match this will also be forwarded to a pool where it will be assigned to another practitioner. The first two are excluded. This practitioner has to perform his analyses in the system, mark all the Galton points and make his annotations. Once he is done he can move to the comparison phase. At that moment the analyses is fixed and cannot be changed or updated. If additional information (in agreement) is found during comparison it will be marked in different colors. If this expert decides that the comparison is sufficient and meets the standard he forwards it to another pool from where the process is repeated. The second expert does not know the conclusion of the first one. Only if both are satisfied and conclude to sufficiency (and absence of discrepancies) the identification will be formalized.

Instead of a verification process we have a double procedure which is as blind as we think it can be. But whatever system we design we can hardly avoid presenting a set of matching prints to an expert for the purpose of comparison. Presenting non matches to a knowledgeable expert is of little use because he would immediately recognize it like with the elimination process of an AFIS candidate list. We do have a system however in which we could inject look a likes and test the quality of it.
If the experts do not arrive at the same conclusion or one of them observes a problem, or sees any reason to give the case further attention this case will be designated for the multiple procedure.
In this multiple procedure three new experts (not involved before) will get the mark and the comparison print in a folder without any information about the case other than the substrate it was found upon.
Each of them will perform a complete analyses using a certain form as guidance and marking the features in a digital image using the Gyro system (assigning confidence levels in colors). In this stage experts use Adobe Photoshop because it offers more flexibility and tools like enhancement, color inversion and layers. Extensive annotations will be made on the form.
Third level detail will be looked for and described as good as possible. We acknowledge that it is virtually impossible to fully document it and allow to a certain extend for a circular process during comparison. After analyses he/she will turn to the comparison phase and document all his/her findings about the similarities, the dissimilarities, the explanations and possible discrepancies. He makes up his mind about the sufficiency of the comparison and writes this down. He also writes down what he wants to discuss and whether or not he wants to give a veto. Veto’s rarely happen but cannot be overruled by anyone.

If all three are done they sit together and discuss the case along the described format. One leads the discussion but all opinions are equal.
The basic idea is that, given the empirical nature of our evidence, we will only go to court when reproducibility is found. We present the evidence on the basis that we presume our conclusion is right because we have never found it be wrong “doing it this way”. This means also that we expect that the identification can be supported by any expert that will look at it using the same procedure and standards. The flip side is that we will not go to court if any one of us objects to it.
One of the benefits of this procedure is that we can separate the good the bad and the ugly and treat them differently. If we present this process to the court (or anyone) we generally meet appreciation and trust that we have done the utmost to assure transparency, quality and independence.
Other benefits are that our ACE-V has flesh on the bone and that we have full documentation. Next we have found that doing it this way it is boosting the knowledge of the young and the old participants. (I personally envy the new staff for learning the job much faster than I did.) The process forces practitioners to verbalize and define what they think they see and what value they assign to it. It makes the highly intuitive job more explicit, fit for discussion, demonstrable and controllable.

Our experiences are that experts who are using this procedure grow towards each other, that is to say most of the time they see the same (the myth of better eyes is false), give it about the same weight, find the same differences and explanations etc. In the beginning it may be scary to read out aloud what you found, analyzed and opine. It is for example hard to find out that you have overlooked certain issues or have missed a difference in ridge count but it challenges you to look better next time. The good thing about it is that practitioners like it because it is really what fingerprinting is about.

Do we apply a numerical standard ?; yes we do. This is a bit off topic may be but since it is brought up I take the opportunity to give an explanation.
We are aware that the application of numerical standard is often presented as a caricature. Those who (still) apply them are by some regarded as backwards and having missed the sign of the times.
Our choice for the use of a numeric threshold is a however a conscious one and blends in with our complete and well defined method. We know about third level detail the development of ridges and pores and their uniqueness. We believe that is the combination of the configuration of the Galton points and the rare organic features which makes fingerprint evidence so strong and standing out. I often use the analogy of Google maps and Google satellite in which an organically developed city (not Manhattan) represents a fingerprint. The map is second level detail and the flow of a river, trees and shapes of houses represent third level detail.
But the axiom of uniqueness does not resolve the issue of establishing the weight of the evidence and sufficiency. Those are two different topics.
Next we have concerns about the consistent reproduction of uniqueness of third level detail in prints and are inclined to be prudent because of chance based similarity. The application of ridgeology has a distinct risk of a picking attitude; i.e. embrace everything you like and ignore everything you don’t. That was our view long before Mayfield occurred.
On a side step, I question the use of third level detail using 500 DPI compressed images of reference fingerprints all together.
Back to the issue of standards.
I assume that most experts agree that an opinion of identification can be rendered if we have met a level of sufficiency. I assume we also agree that the analysis of fingerprints is a quantitative and qualitative based process. The problem is how we define sufficiency and how we establish it in practice.
Our numerical part of the standard is 10 to 12. We are allowed to make a full identification if we found 12 Galton points we agree upon (within the multiple procedure all three experts) or 10-11 Galton points if and when there is extra, similar information of a fingerprint nature. This could be similarity in ridge detail and most of the times it is. For all the individual points it is established that they are present, in agreement and significant. In this manner we operate in close agreement with the early ideas of Locard.
Yes we look at ridge detail, flow of the individual ridges, pores etc. and incorporate this in our judgment for the weight of the individual points and the total weight. Those who are interested in more detail are invited to look at the Interpol website for the documents of the IEEGFI I and II working groups which reflect what we do and how we do it. http://www.interpol.int/Public/Forensic ... efault.asp

We do not identify because we have found sufficient points, only after we have found that sufficiency criteria are met both with respect to quantity and quality.
Does a fixed standard have arbitrary aspects? Yes like any standard it has. But I regard a system applying a personal standard on a case by case basis as an arbitrary system. In my view a personal standard is an oxymoron. (like; pretty ugly or Microsoft works)
I note that in discussions a standard is often confused with an SOP. (Merriam Webster; Standard; something set up and established by authority as a rule for the measure of quantity, weight, extent, value, or quality )
The function of a standard is to secure the solidity of the conclusion that is based upon it. So far we are confident our standards have contributed to that although I will never claim infallibility.
Does the standard have a scientific basis? No, it has not, and we have never claimed it to be so. A standard is a practical instrument with a sensible purpose and valid basis. I would like to refer to many standards in use in many scientific disciplines, those who are interested could read the transcript of Dr John Thornton’s presentation; “Setting Standards In The Comparison and Identification” that can be found here; http://www.latent-prints.com/Thornton.htmThe question could also be inverted to; “does the use of an non-numerical standard (or an holistic approach) have a scientific basis ?”
There are many benefits for the use of this type of standard which are described in the IEEGFI report nr. 1, under “the Empirical Standard Approach”, so I will not list them here.

In discussions about this subject we are sometimes confronted with the reproach that we "fail"to make an identification even if we feel, or are personally convinced, “it’s him” So we are blamed for missing identifications and ignoring valuable evidence. I will separate these two hereafter.
First I will address identification. If we accept that we need to reach a level of sufficiency (no matter how it is defined) before we can identify then there will be cases where the mark is insufficient to. So in any system this situation can occur. If this is ignored or ironed out the gut feeling or conviction has become the basis for our identifications rather than standards and procedures. We observe a perfect circular reasoning,” you must identify it because you know it’s him”
This is like; Johan Cruijff is the best soccer player of all times because he was the best. (Which of course he is, how could anyone ever question that!)

In any case, no matter how low or how high the standard is, there will be marks floating around the edge and experts will have different opinions upon them. If this occurs is the expert concluding to insufficiency bound to give up his personal standard too?
The reproach that identifications are missed is based upon the premises that we know the donor but we fail to identify him. Since we do not know the ground truth this reproach is unscientific by nature.
An interesting question remains however; is the number of identifications is affected by the application of different standards and how. We have once estimated that, based upon the number of drop outs in the multiple procedure, there is a potential of 0,2% of investigated cases that fail the standard and could have a different outcome by applying a lower standard.
Bruce Grant from NSY presented the first figures based upon the experiences with the change to the non numeric system at an Interpol conference in Lyon in 2003. He announced that they had increased the number of identified cases with slightly less than 0,1% as a result of the introduction.
The “extra” identifications only exist if and when in general the “personal standard” is lower than 10. This is an assumption of which we don’t know it is true either. There may be significant fluctuations between experts and even with the same expert over time for example when look a likes or misidentifications are encountered.
We have experiences with cooperation between “numeric’s” and “non-numeric’s” in collaborative exercises and with the exchange of staff in both directions. We have found that the differences in practice are small; in fact we experience more commonalities than differences. In working together with a “ridgeologist” I once got the spontaneous reaction; “you are no point counter at all”. I replied; “I know, please tell the rest of the world”.

A different subject is that valuable evidence is supposed to be lost by applying some kind of sufficiency threshold, dividing marks in “of value” and “of non value”. This reproach is generally voiced by the scientific community outside fingerprinting and may have been true in past times but is handled differently in our operations for quite some time now.
If it is required and beneficial for the investigation of a case in court we would report the findings of a multiple procedure even if a comparison fails to meet the standard. We think we cannot and should not keep this from the court. What we would report is that we have compared the mark in question with a fingerprint from subject X; that we found similarities that did not meet the standard of sufficiency; that no discrepancies were found and that we thus cannot eliminate the investigated person as the possible donor. We would also indicate that we are aware that we are operating in the danger zone (with respect to chance look a likes) and that a reliable instrument to objectively assign weight to the found similarities fail. Since objective and empirical data are missing any opinion provided would be speculative. Even if someone, hypothetically, would provide such an opinion, reproducibility of it could and should not be pretended. Still the conclusion that a person/donor cannot be excluded can be used in the proceedings as information this to the discretion of the court.

The Netherlands Forensic Institute in cooperation with our department has developed a probabilistic model to evaluate the weight of the evidence using the configuration of Galton points.
Starting September this year we would be able to put these insufficient marks in the model and to provide an objective weight to the equation in its context.
This is in agreement with the position from the IAI as presented at the annual conference in 2010.
Arie Zeelenberg

Thanks Arie, I knew two things when I joined this thread, firstly I would learn some more and secondly you would produce a very considered and well articulated response. I'm on a lunch break so a few thoughts to keep the thread going. The work of Locard was pioneering as was that of Whipple and Galton, Henry, Faulds and Herschel. For each pioneer there have been progressive changes to how and why things are done differently in a modern context. The NAFIS is a classic example of doing away with the system of TP classification. The biometric algorithm in NAFIS provides both the reliability of function and efficiency needed on todays scale of operations The confidence the program designers had in designing that algorithm relied upon the soundness of the principles of biological uniqueness of friction skin. The studies of Whipple have been complimented by contemporary research in biological development looking at the interdependence of the epidermis with the nervous tissues as a composite whole. These scientific advances confirm the uniqueness of areas of friction skin. The transfer of friction skin to a substrate begins the challenge for latent fingerprint examinations. The ground truth is that the source friction skin can replicate the transfer under the same conditions. To study the representation of the latent print requires the combination of qualitative and quantitative variables. Both are interdependent within a flexible region known as 'sufficiency' allowing us to conclude that the transfer latent is sourced or excluded. The flexibility of sufficiency requires a judgement by the expert as to when 'recognition' or 'exclusion' has occured. Contemporary definitions of 'sufficiency' include the expression of 'objective data under observation'. Here we see the challenge to the expert requiring proof that sufficiency has been reached under the variables of quality and quantity of details. Im in favour of the no set number standard since it requires the expert to establish facts and record decisions and provide calculated weight to judgements without the need to meet a practical number based on an early pioneer. The verification process of using two experts who approach the fingerprint examination in the same way provides safety to the community and the courts. Cheers from oz. Les

As I read these postings I can’t help but feel it is a bit like putting the cart before the horse.

Is there any legal requirement to have a fingerprint checked by more than one expert?

Given that evidence is provided by Independent experts without any corroboration or indeed having their findings verified and is accepted by Courts then the answer must be no.

Can someone fill me in with why two or three experts need to verify an identification?

Is it purely to stop misidentifications? Given the small number of actual misidentifications this would be an enormous waste of resources if this was the case.

What are the reasons to have a print checked by three experts?

As I read the postings I believe the real issue is not with the number of verifications but actually lies with the competence and skills of the Fingerprint Experts.

Here is Scotland we still have Experts who work away identifying prints, preparing evidence for Court and being allowed to testify under oath when both their organisation and indeed the Crown Office know they made serious errors some 14 years ago! Namely Edward Bruce, Alister Geddes and Terrance Foley.

In Scotland I understand Experts can qualify in 3 years. Bearing in mind they are being overseen by an ‘Expert’ who started training one whole month after qualifying as an expert and who has never given expert evidence in any Court.

But wait I hear you say surely the Scottish Experts are subjected to a Yearly Competency Test. Absolutely, but as Joanne Tierney, the Head of the Edinburgh Fingerprint Bureau testified at the Public Enquiry you cannot fail it.

Q. Can I deal with competency tests now, please. What
would constitute a failure under the current competency
testing?

A. The CTS results paperwork doesn't talk in terms of pass
or failure. What it talks in terms of is conformance to
the bulk of the majority of results or non-conformances.
So when you get your results 99 per cent of the people
that looked at mark 1 identified it to A, if you didn't
identify it to A you're in the 1 per cent. So that
would be a nonconformance against the majority of the
examination.

Q. So it is really a qualitative assessment rather than a
pass or fail, if I can put it that way?

A. Yes. It's not recorded in terms of pass of fail.

So when Experts state on their Court statements they undertake an Annual Competency Test they fail to disclose that it is result in a pass or a fail.

I wonder how this equates with the candidate identified as E7GLEN from Test Number 10-516

http://www.ctsforensics.com/assets/news/3016_Web.pdf (page eight)

From 12 sample prints compared they achieved the following results:

5 out of 12 results determined by E7GLEN agreed with the CTS Test

4 out of 12 results were determined by E7GLEN to be not identical but were actual identifications

3 out of 12 results by E7GLEN were determined to be identical but were in fact not identical, therefore misidentified.

If E7GLEN is an Expert working in Scotland then these results would not by recorded as a fail.

E7GLEN would be able to state on their court evidence they have undertaken an Annual Competency test without ever having to reveal the truth.

As a Science how are Independent Experts monitored? In fact I believe they are not. They can openly lie about their qualifications, be allowed to practice without ever sitting any sort of Competency Test and indeed without ever having their work corroborated or verified. And this is accepted without challenge by the Science.

Before addressing how many Experts should or should not be verifying prints the Science should have a good long hard look at the Competency of the very Experts who represent the Science.

I am reminded of the shameful and disgraceful evidence at the Fingerprint Enquiry of one Edward Bruce, a current serving Scottish Fingerprint Expert. He has apparently being fully trained by the Scottish Police Services Authority under the non-numeric fingerprint system, but he was exposed by his total lack of knowledge and expertise.

I am disappointed by the lack of response by Richard Case as to why the NPIA pilot was delayed. This was as a direct result of a misidentification within an English Bureau in 2010, which I believe has been suppressed. Richard informed me it was not swept under the carpet as I suggested, but all the evidence I have suggest otherwise.

I plan to start a new post in the next few days on this very subject in which I will offer my observations and ask some very serious questions. If Richard Case is correct, and the misidentification was not suppressed, I look forward to finding out what really happened, with the answers being given on this public forum. Full details to follow.

I wonder how many Experts have any clue as to what I am referring to?

Again I go back and suggest the Science looks at the standard of Experts and their competency before worrying whether two or three experts should verify prints.

Taggart wrote:Is there any legal requirement to have a fingerprint checked by more than one expert?

Again I go back and suggest the Science looks at the standard of Experts and their competency before worrying whether two or three experts should verify prints.

According to Sir Karl Popper, arguably the greatest philosopher of science in the 20th century, the test of science is "falsifiability." A hypothesis must be "falsifiable" to be scientific. In other words, it must be capable of being tested. It is the capability, not the testing in any single case, that makes the field a science.

A conclusion must be capable of being proven or disproven. In fingerprints, we say "verified." To be scientific, a conclusion need not actually be verified. It simply needs to be verifiable. If a conclusion is not verifiable, it cannot be accepted as correct.

The number of verifications does not make fingerprint identification any more scientific. The fact that conclusions are testable is what makes fingerprint identification scientific. The cases of misidentification of Shirley McKie, Brandon Mayfield, and David Asbury would seem to indicate that more verifications do not make better science.

As Taggart states, it is the accuracy and reliability of the practitioner that is critical.

A conclusion is not better because three or more incompetent people agree.

hi Tagget
I think John T has already answered your question.
I am Sure the John will now be in Christchuch as part of the DVI team responding to the earthquake, so I doubt he will be on line. We are with all the people in Christchurch at this time.
I understand from the media that there are teams coming in from Australia the UK and likely from the US and Japan. Thanks to those countries coming. Actually the NSW team has arrived from Sydney.
For those interested Christchurch is a city that most New Zealanders would have considered being one of the most safe cities in the world to live 12 months ago.

Hi Neville,

Terrible situation in Christchurch, my thoughts and prayers are with your people especially the DVI teams who will now be working very hard to complete their tasks. Kind regards Les