Lisa,
Speaking as a defense attorney, I have deep concerns about admitting evidence "for what its worth" and trusting to cross-examination, closing, and maybe jury instructions to guide the jurors.
I understand your point, I didn't want to intrude on the strategies of those whose case this is. I was referring to the fact that as a compromise, one that I am NOT a fan and think that there would be greater error and harm in the long run, but at least puts the evidence in front of the jury, is to do what I affectionately refer to as "neutered testimony". This is what Pollack first suggested in Plaza I and has been done in a handful of Forensic Document cases. This is where the examiner can present the images, the matching features, perhaps even say it's a match, but not allowed to opine as to what that signifies and perhaps for this judge would not allow "individualization opinions to the exclusion of all others" and discussion of certainty, error, etc. Simply put them before the jury and discuss characterstics of similarity and dissimilarity. Again I can't stress how dangerous I believe this to be, compared to the much smaller probability of an error (especially in a case where multiple ids have been made to the individual). It also seems to run counter to Rule 702 and the entire reason for the expert in the first place... But at least it's viewed by the jury. I didn't actually want to suggest this openly, since I do not support it, but that's what I was alluding to...but since you called me out....
Outsider,
It seems to me that this puts this case right at the opposite end of the continuum from the case that has taken my interest.
Well, I don't think it's on the 'opposite' end. Mayfield is on the opposite end to me, in that it is similar to the DNA debate of a "TRAWL" case v. "CONFIRMATION" case. Developing a suspect from a database with no other evidence to tie to the case is a trawl. This has a very different prior probability (everyone in the database has equal chances of being a suspect) until the evidence is examined. Whereas in the confirmation case, a suspect is developed hopefully due to good intelligence. The examiner then compares the information and a match occurs. The prior is much higher than in the latter confirmation case. [PS-the examiner does NOT have to know about the intelligence, just be given a name to compare...so no need to jump to the whole bias argument...it is irrelevant to the probabilities]. Some statiticians have argued that these are different cases, and the confirmation case would have a stronger posterior probability for the prosecution's hypothesis of guilt. There are other statiticians who might disagree on some nuances and interpretation. In any event, yes Outsider, you hit the nail on the head with that distinction in that there are different prior probs, which was what I was alluding too...[if anyone wants the papers and discussions w/ respect to DNA CODIS database cases and those discussions, I also have those...]
Outsider, if you wish to discuss more offline about 'that case', I would be happy to...
g.